questions regarding act 5 and mental requirements. 6 In both contexts, its resolution of these matters ran the gamut from restrictive to permissive. Although the Court probably recognized the relevance of limiting overzealous law enforcement in its applications of the fourth and fifth amendments, it was seemingly unaware that the regulative concerns of enforcement should have informed its statutory constructions as well. One goal of this article is to sensitize judges and advocates to the kinds of considerations the Court seems to have overlooked.
Because of our confused attitudes toward gun control legislation, such laws are a particularly apt subject for a study of strict construction. While a majority of Americans apparently favor gun control in some form, 7 the substantial minority of gunholders remain vigorously opposed even to legislation that would not seem to affect them. 8 One hypothesis for this staunch opposition is that gunholders fear expansive judicial interpretations of gun control statutes and the overreaching by law enforcement personnel which, they believe, would surely follow such interpretations. 9 The rule of strict construction addresses this fear directly by promising limited interpretations of enacted statutes.
The widespread belief in a constitutional right to bear arms adds further interest to the study of strict construction of gun control legislation. Regardless of the varied perceptions regarding the presumed source of this right-whether the federal'° or a state constitution" or the general right to defend oneself and one's family 2 -it is incontrovertible that a large majority of Americans believe that they do have the right to possess weapons. ' 3 The perception that gun ownership is protected behavior dramatically affects the enforceability of gun control statutes. Given the large volume of firearms in private hands, 14 the effectiveness of any far-reaching gun control initiative depends on voluntary compliance; believers in a right to bear arms are significantly less likely to comply.' 5 Because of its importance to the enforcement of gun control statutes, the perception of a right to possess weapons should be a factor in the interpretation of such statutes.
Also relevant to strict construction is the history of gun control as a tool of discrimination. The earliest American gun control statutes were directed at blacks and immigrants,' 6 and modern opponents of gun control have emphasized its potential for aiding racism and sexism.1 7 Beyond discrimination against recognized minorities is the question of invidious treatment of the "gun subculture";' 8 there is much evidence that members of the nongunholding population consider discrimination against gun owners commendable.' 9 Strict construction is a device for limiting the discriminatory use of criminal statutes against any identifiable minority.
A final reason to examine strict construction of gun legislation is reflected in the set of relatively recent publications expressing second thoughts about the wisdom of gun control laws. Criminologists and criminal law theorists, including former gun control supporters, have argued that the crime-reducing potential of gun control has been exaggerated 20 and that its potential enforcement costs are high. 2 1 Given this dubiety regarding the effectiveness of gun legislation, courts should be even more hesitant to extend a gun control statute to a case outside the core meaning of that statute. This article's study of strict construction of gun control statutes has three parts. Part II generally explains the rule of strict construction and its function as a limit on arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Part III describes the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the first three Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 1968 Act. Part IV examines the lower federal courts' subsequent use of these decisions in order to show some of the costs resulting from the Court's failure to impose adequate limits on law enforcement.
II CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSED LIMITS ON ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the defendant is one of a trio of doctrines that limit overzealous enforcement of criminal laws. 22 Along with the principle of legality (the concept that crimes must have been defined prior to their enforcement), 23 and the void-for-vagueness doctrine, 24 the rule of strict construction not only assures more complete notice of the prohibitions of the criminal law, 2 5 but also limits the ability of police and prosecutors to use that law to harass and intimidate the public.
In The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 26 Herbert Packer outlined the impact of these three doctrines on criminal law enforcement. Eschewing the customary explanation of the principle of legality-that it maintains the separation of powers between legislature and judiciary 27 -Packer argued that the principle's most important function is "to prevent abuses of official discretion" 2 8 by those who commence the criminal process, that is, by police officers and prosecutors. " [I] n a system that lodges the all-important , is a celebrated example of the notice function of the rule of strict construction. The .1IcBoyle Court, through Justice Holmes, held that an airplane was not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of a federal statute prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles. "[Flair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed." Id. at 27. The same reasoning also explains the notice functions of the requirements of a previously stated, unambiguous definition of the crime. initiating power in the hands of officials who operate, as they must, through informal and secret processes, there must be some devices to insure that the initiating decisions are, to the greatest extent possible, fair, evenhanded, and rational." 2 Though a number of trial-related mechanisms serve to maximize evenhandedness, 3 0 Packer argued that "the most important single device is the requirement. . . that the police and prosecutors confine their attention to the catalogue of what has already been defined as criminal." 3 '
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The void-for-vagueness doctrine limits arbitrary enforcement in much the same way. A vague criminal statute offers law enforcement personnel opportunities for selective interpretation, harassment, and intimidation. The primary vice of an ambiguous statute, therefore, is not that it delegates too much lawmaking power to the courts, but that it delegates too much lawenforcing discretion to police and prosecutors. 3 2 This line of reasoning in support of the void-for-vagueness doctrine lies at the heart of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 3 3 in which the Court struck down a municipal vagrancy statute used to arrest two white women and two black men traveling together in an automobile. 3 4 "Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police " the United States Supreme Court admitted, " [b] ut the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that evenhanded administration of the law is not possible." '3 5 As Papachristou demonstrated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine has constitutional force, 36 as does the principle of legality. 3 7 This force varies considerably, however, depending on the type of person likely to be harassed and the type of conduct likely to be intimidated. A vague statute that invites, or at least is challenged in a context suggesting, racially discriminatory 29. Id. at 89. On the necessary secrecy of police and prosecutorial activities, see id. 30. Examples include a subsequent judicial determination of probable cause to arrest, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1975) ; the requirement of a grand jury indictment, see U.S. CONST. amend. V; and the disallowance of prosecutions based on impermissible prosecutorial motives, see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
31. H. PACKER, supra note 26, at 90. To illustrate the principle of legality at work, Packer noted that when LSD became a drug of choice in the mid-1960's, law enforcement personnel largely delayed policing the drug's use until specific legislative prohibitions were enacted. Id.
32. Packer described the void-for-vagueness doctrine as an injunction [to the legislature] to take care in the framing of criminal statutes that no more power be given to call conduct into question as criminal, with all the destruction of human autonomy that this power necessarily imports, than is reasonably needed to deal with the conduct the lawmakers seek to prevent. These facets of analysis under the principle of legality and the vagueness doctrine-concern over arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and heightened scrutiny when protected classes or protected freedoms are involved-also emerge during examination of the rule of strict construction of penal statutes, which Packer labeled "something of a junior version of the vagueness doctrine. ' 39 Like the prohibition against vague statutes, the prescription that criminal laws be construed in favor of the defendant limits the range of discretion of those who enforce the law. Consider Keeler v. Superior Court, 40 which held that a brutal feticide was not murder because a viable but unborn fetus was not a "human being" within the meaning of California's murder statute. This result can be justified as a minimization of the opportunities for inventiveness available to prosecutors and police officers in their enforcement of the criminal laws. As a limit on arbitrary enforcement, the rule of strict construction derives some of its force from constitutional law (though the rule's constitutional underpinnings are by no means as clear as those of the principle of legality and the vagueness doctrine). 4 2 The rule's constitutional force is shown by its resilience in the face of legislative attempts to abrogate the strict construction principle. 43 Such attempts have had only checkered success; courts frequently ignore abrogating statutes or render them impotent through judicial construction. 44 (Burke, Acting C.J., dissenting). Packer noted the tendency, in the context of the principle of legality, to present arbitrary enforcement arguments in terms of fair notice:
The "fair notice" rationale is a prophylactic rationale for tomorrow's hard case rather than today's easy one. It represents a reaction that is one of the most characteristic and ingrained responses in the human situation and therefore in the law: if we let you do this, how do we know that you won't use it as a justification for doing something we wouldn't want you to do? H. PACKER, sopra note 26, at 85; see also id. ("[Ilt is not ... that this man . . . is being unfairly taken bv surprise. It is that if we let you do this to these fellows, who so richly deserve it, how do we know that yot won't do it to us?") (emphasis in original).
42. Hall noted, "strict interpretation continues to prevail in American penal law."-4 5 Other than characterizing this trend as naked judicial usurpation, 4 " the only possible explanation is that the rule of strict construction derives at least some of its power from a source not subject to statutory changespecifically, constitutional law.
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Of course, courts do not always construe criminal statutes strictly, or as strictly as possible. 4 8 The impact of liberal construction on protected classes and protected freedoms has much to do with this variation. Thus, one consideration probably on the minds of the Keeler majority (though not voiced in their opinion) was the potential impact of a contrary holding on persons obtaining and performing abortions under California's then quite liberal abortion law. 4 9 If killing a viable fetus had been held to be murder, what would prevent a prosecutor from filing murder charges against those who conspired to end the life of a nonviable but healthy fetus-its mother and her doctor? 50 And even if no such prosecution ever occurred, would its mere possibility deter some women from seeking abortions and some physicians from performing them? 5 The rule of strict construction is not without its detractors. 54 In 1935, Livingston Hall argued that it was the rampant use of capital punishment in seventeenth and eighteenth century England that had caused strict construction to flourish; consequently, the advent of more proportionate sentencing should have rendered the doctrine an anachronism. 5 5 But even Livingston Hall would have required strict construction in some circumstances: "IT]his does not mean that all penal statutes should be liberally construed. Political liberty does require that people should be able to pursue certain types of conduct with definite assurance of the bounds of criminal liability." 5 6 The examples Hall gave to support this assertionmostly crimes affecting commercial and sporting activities 57 -reflect a 1935 concept of protected behavior; nevertheless, the assertion demonstrates that even an opponent of strict construction recognized the need for such a rule in the context of protected conduct.
Livingston Hall's "weak" form of strict construction is followed in some American jurisdictions, while others employ a stronger version, recognizing few exceptions to the rule. Potent arguments in favor of the "strong" form of acquire a firearm or ammunition; 6 ' (2) to ship, transport, or receive a firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce if one has been indicted for or convicted of a felony; is a fugitive from justice; is an unlawful addict or user of depressants, stimulants, or narcotics, or has been adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution; 6 2 (3) to transport, receive, store, dispose of, or pledge as security for a loan a stolen firearm or stolen ammunition moving in interstate commerce, knowing or having reason to know the firearm or ammunition is stolen; 6 3 (4) to transport or receive in interstate commerce any firearm with an altered serial number; 6 4 or (5) to knowingly import a firearm or ammunition into the United States without an appropriate permit or to knowingly receive a firearm or ammunition so imported. 6 5 Section 922 also criminalizes knowingly delivering a package containing a firearm or ammunition to a common carrier for interstate transport without written notice of the package's contents, as well as criminalizing the carrier's transport of the package if the carrier knows or has reason to know that its shipment is illegal.
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For those who are not licensed to transact in firearms and ammunition, it is a crime under section 922: (1) to import, manufacture, or deal in firearms or ammunition or to ship, transport, or receive a firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce; 6 7 (2) to transport into one's home state or to receive there a firearm obtained from outside the state; 68 or (3) to transfer a firearm to a person who resides in another state, unless that person has a license to conduct firearms transactions. 6 9 Section 922 also prohibits nonlicensees from transporting in interstate commerce certain highly effective firearms and "destructive devices," unless an appropriate permit is obtained.
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For licensed importers, manufacturers, dealers, and collectors of firearms or ammunition, section 922 criminalizes the following acts: (1) transporting, in interstate commerce and to a nonlicensee, any firearm or ammunition; 7 ' (2) selling or delivering a firearm or ammunition to persons who the licensee knows or has reason to know either are underage or do not reside in the state 61. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1982) . The provision applies to acquisition only from those licensed to deal in firearms and ammunition.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)-(h) (1982) . The subsections use the term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" instead of "felony." "Depressant," "stimulant." and "narcotic" are defined by reference to other statutes. 73 (4) selling or delivering a firearm or ammunition to a person who has been indicted for or convicted of a felony; who is a fugitive from justice; who is an unlawful addict or user of depressants, stimulants or narcotics; or who has been adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution; 74 and (5) knowingly falsifying or omitting to make any required record of a firearms or ammunition transaction. 75 Under section 922 licensees are also forbidden to sell or deliver specified firearms and destructive devices, unless appropriate permits are obtained.
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Section 923 establishes numerous recordkeeping requirements for those licensed to transact in firearms and allows access to their premises by federal inspectors. 77 Section 924 renders any violation of section 922 punishable by five years' imprisonment, a fine of $5,000, or both. 78 The section also authorizes an additional sentence of from one to ten years for any federal crime committed with a firearm.
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The second set of criminal penalties imposed by the 1968 Act were amendments to the appendix to title 18 of the federal code. Section 1202 inculpates a person who receives, possesses, or transports a firearm in interstate commerce and who: (1) has been convicted of a felony, dishonorably discharged, or adjudged mentally incompetent; (2) has renounced his United States citizenship; or (3) is an alien illegally within the United States. 80 The section also makes it a crime for any employee of a 72. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (3) (1982). One must be at least 18 years old to receive a shotgun, rifle, or shotgun or rifle ammunition and at least 21 to receive any other firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (1982) .
Subsection (b)(3), pertaining to sales to nonresidents, does not apply to a resident of a state contiguous to the state of the licensee's place of business, if the sale satisfies the legal requirements of both states. Nor does the subsection apply to temporary rentals for sporting purposes or to sales of shotguns or rifles to out-of-state hunters and sport shooters who are replacing lost weapons. "Felony" includes all crimes punishable b% imprisonment for more than one year, except those crimes labeled misdemeanors that do not involve a firearm and are not punishable by more than two years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(2) (1982).
person who satisfies one of these three criteria to receive, possess, or transport a firearm in interstate commerce.
8 1 The penalty for violating section 1202 is two years' imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both.11 2 The third set of criminal provisions in the Gun Control Act of 1968 amended the National Firearms Act of 1934.83 The 1934 Act, in the words of Franklin Zimring, "was a concentrated attack on civilian ownership of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, silencers, and other relatively rare firearms that had acquired reputations as gangster weapons during the years preceding its passage." 8 4 The 1968 Act extended this provision to include other similar weapons and "destructive devices;" ' 85 the amendments also removed a registration requirement that the Supreme Court had voided, on selfincrimination grounds, earlier in 1968.86
The 1968 Act also reorganized the criminal provisions of the earlier legislation in section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 5861 declares it unlawful for a person: (1) to manufacture, import, or deal in the specified weapons without registering and paying the necessary tax; 8 7 (2) to make or transfer a specified weapon without paying the necessary tax or to receive or possess a weapon so made or transferred; 88 (3) to receive or possess a specified weapon that is not registered to him; 8 9 (4) to alter the serial number of a specified weapon or to receive or possess a weapon so altered; 90 and (5) to knowingly make a false entry on any required record pertaining to a specified weapon. 9 ' The penalty for violating section 5861 is ten years' imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. The criminal provisions of the 1968 Act are complex, overlapping, and frequently technical. Unfortunately, in such a legislative scheme, federal agents and prosecutors can easily find opportunities for harassment and intimidation of the firearm-holding populace. 93 One responsibility of the courts is to limit these opportunities for arbitrary enforcement by strictly construing the provisions of the 1968 Act in favor of the criminal defendant; in the federal system, this responsibility lies ultimately with the Supreme Court.
A. Supreme Court Interpretation-United States v. Freed
The first prosecution under the 1968 Act to reach the Supreme Court was United States v. Freed. 9 4 The government had charged Donald Freed and Shirley Sutherland with possession of unregistered hand grenades in violation of section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code 9 5 and with conspiracy to possess these weapons. 96 Defendants successfully moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming both that registering the hand grenades would have compelled them to incriminate themselves and that the indictment was fatally deficient because it failed to allege that the defendants knew the hand grenades were unregistered. This argument found support in the companion case to Haynes, Marchetti v. United States. 103 In Marchetti, which provided a self-incrimination defense to wagering tax and registration prosecutions, the Court, through Justice Harlan, noted that the information requirement posed self-incrimination problems with regard to future acts, as well as past and present ones: "The hazards of incrimination . . .as to future acts are not trifling or imaginary.
Prospective registrants can reasonably expect that registration and payment of the occupational tax will significantly enhance the likelihood of their prosecution for future acts, and that it will readily provide evidence which will It is curious that, after emphasizing the protection against incrimination for future offenses provided by the administrative policy of nondisclosure, the Court added a paragraph suggesting that the fifth amendment required no such protection. Without further elaboration, Justice Douglas wrote: "Appellees' argument assumes the existence of a periphery of the SelfIncrimination Clause which protects a person against incrimination not only against past or present transgressions but which supplies insulation for a career of crime about to be launched. We cannot give the Self-Incrimination Clause such an expansive interpretation."' ' 0 8 The implication that the state can constitutionally compel self-incrimination regarding offenses not yet committed is inconsistent both with Marchetti and with the Freed Court's own reliance on the administrative policy of nondisclosure.
The Freed decision's inconsistency on this point is unfortunate because it suggests that a subsequent administration could depart from the previous policy, by providing registration information to other law enforcement 104. 390 U.S. at 54. Regarding the federal wagering statute's propensity to compel selfincrimination as to past or present crimes, see id. at 44-49.
105. 401 U.S. at 605-07. 106. Specifically, the opinion noted: "[N]o information filed is as a matter of practice disclosed to any law enforcement authority, except as the fact of nonregistration may be necessary to an investigation or prosecution under the present Act." 401 U.S. at 604 (emphasis deleted). The Court apparently did not consider it significant that the government had not disclosed this policy to the public, see id. at 604, and that Freed and Sutherland therefore could have reasonably concluded that registration would have been incriminating.
107. 401 U.S. at 606 (quoting 11archetti, 390 U.S. at 53 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951))); cf iinfra text accompanying note 109 (Marchetti reached the opposite conclusion on the same argument).
108. Freed, 401 U.S. at 606-07. In his separate opinion in Freed, Justice Brennan interpreted the Court's statement in a unique fashion. Justice Brennan joined the self-incrimination portion of the Court's opinion with the understanding that the statutory limit on prosecutorial use of registration information extended not only to past and present crimes, but also to future crimes of possession.
"because possession is a continuing violation." Id. at 6il (Brennan, J.. concurring in the judgment of reversal); see also id. n.2. With this caveat, Justice Brennan "agreeldI with the Court that the SelfIncrimination Clause . . . does not require that immunity be given as to the use of registraion I information in connection with crimes that the transferee might possibly commit in the future with the registered firearm." Id. at 611. agencies, without reviving the fifth amendment concerns adjudicated in Haynes and Freed. The Court could have avoided creating this temptation, and could have placed a more effective limit on the discretionary authority of those controlling disclosure of the registration information, by unambiguously holding that the administrative policy of nondisclosure was necessary to save the statute from unconstitutionality. Reading a future crimes limitation into the 1968 Act in this fashion would have given permanence to a policy that otherwise is subject to the whims of its administrators. 109 The federal district court had accepted the other reason defendants advanced for dismissing the indictment: the failure to allege that the defendants knew the hand grenades were unregistered. The government argued on appeal that while the statute 1 0 did require allegation and proof that the defendants knowingly possessed hand grenades, it did not require proof of knowledge (or any other mens rea) in regard to the unregistered status of the weapons. 1 ' The Supreme Court accepted this reasoning in a strikingly overbroad embrace of strict liability.
After acknowledging that "mens rea was long a requirement of criminal responsibility,"' 12 Justice Douglas noted: "But the list of exceptions grew, especially in the expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare. If the regulatory nature of section 5861 justified dispensing with the requirement of mens rea in regard to one element of the offense, however, it could justify applying strict liability to all the elements of the offense. Indeed, the drug regulation cases relied on by the Freed Court approved pure strict liability offenses, not just crimes with one or more strict liability elements.' '" So the overbreadth of the Freed opinion invites prosecutors to apply section 5861 not only to persons who did not know of the unregistered status of the 109. Cf infra text accompanying notes 201-05 (Freed was the basis for allowing truthful and immune testimony before a grand jury to be used to prove perjury, the one exception to the immunity, on the part of the defendant).
110. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1982) ("It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to . . . possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record . "). A hand grenade is a "firearm" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (f) (1982 dangerous weapons they possessed, but also to those who did not even know that they were in possession of dangerous weapons.' 17 Justice Brennan recognized this defect in the Court's reasoning'8 and filed a separate opinion concurring in the result only. In his opinion, Justice Brennan began with the assertion that " '[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.' "1 19 Regarding the element of knowing possession of one of the weapons covered by section 5861, he found little to rebut the application of this rule;' 20 concerning the unregistered status of the weapon, however, Justice Brennan discovered that "the case law under the provisions replaced by the current law dispensed with proof of intent in connection with this element."'' z This factor, plus the great "likelihood of governmental regulation" of weapons such as hand grenades, 2 2 convinced justice Brennan that Congress did not intend to require proof of knowledge of the lack of registration in prosecutions under section 5861.
Though the concurrence in Freed was more measured than the opinion of the Court, it too had faults. Justice Brennan did not offer sufficient reasons to overcome the presumption of a mens rea requirement. His reliance on the likelihood of regulation recalled the "regulatory offense" justification given by the Freed majority, a justification Justice Brennan himself criticized.' 23 In addition, the case law supporting the application of strict liability to the lackof-registration element was a very weak reed. Justice Brennan cited only Sipes v. United States, 124 an opinion written by Justice Blackmun while he was a judge on the court of appeals. Sipes considered a prosecution for possession of a weapon made in violation of section 5861's predecessor statute; 2 5 the weapon had been altered, which constituted the unlawful making.' 26 While the Sipes court held that knowledge of the alteration of the weapon was not 117. The language of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1982) , supra note 110, would certainly permit this interpretation. See generally infra text accompanying notes 219-53. As to the possibility that one might innocently own a hand grenade without knowing it, see infra note 122.
118. "It is no help in deciding what level of intent must be proved ... to declare that the offense falls within the 'regulatory' category." 401 U.S. at 612-13 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment of reversal necessary for a conviction, 12 7 the opinion also noted that Sipes himself had performed at least one of the alterations, which strongly implied that he knew of the unlawful making.' 2 8 Thus, the ruling used by the Freed concurrence to overcome the usual requirement of mens rea was unnecessary to support the holding in Sipes. Furthermore, it applied to a requirement of unlawful making, not to the element of lack of registration.
The Freed concurrence thus encourages prosecutors to speculate on how easy it might be to overcome the presumption of a mens rea requirement with regard to other elements of other offenses. 129 A stricter adherence to mens rea requirements would thwart such prosecutorial creativity and the arbitrary exercise of discretion that can accompany it.
One further shortcoming of the Freed opinions is noteworthy. Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Brennan considered the special mens rea problem raised by the conspiracy count against Freed and Sutherland. On one theory, conspiracy implies at least a knowledge requirement for all elements of the offense conspired to, even when no mens rea is required for some elements of the completed crime. But a majority of the Court balked, on the ground that Congress' intent was unclear as to whether the phrase modified "possesses." Holding that "the statutory materials [we]re inconclusive," and that the Court was "left with an ambiguous statute,"' ' 3 9 the majority, speaking through Justice Marshall, elected to construe section 1202 in favor of the defendant. In support of this choice, the Bass Court strongly relied on the rule of strict construction of penal statutes: "[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."' 40 The Court emphasized that such a rule would provide fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, while maintaining a separation of powers between the legislature and the Without a stronger indication from Congress, the Court refused to assume such a significant shift in the federal-state balance.
The Court's concern over federalism masked a deeper constitutional issue. Throughout his prosecution, Bass had argued that the statute as interpreted by the government was beyond the power of Congress to enact: No grant of constitutional authority contemplated federal intrusion into an area of purely local interest. 143 Thus, according to Bass, application of the commerce nexus to possession, bringing it within the scope of the commerce clause, was necessary to save the provision from unconstitutionality. In reversing Bass' conviction, the Second Circuit had accepted much of this argument; the court expressed "serious doubt" about the constitutionality of the government's interpretation of section 1202. Supreme Court opinion rendered after the circuit court's decision in Bass but before the high court's action in that case.
Perez upheld a federal anti-loansharking statute that required no proof of a commerce nexus, relying instead on congressional findings that all loansharking activity has an impact on interstate commerce. 14 7 Because the Gun Control Act of 1968 contained a finding that a felon's possession of a firearm burdens interstate commerce, 14 8 Perez would seem to dispel most doubts about the authority of Congress to criminalize such possession even in the absence of a commerce nexus.
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The Supreme Court's willingness to construe strictly the provision at issue in Bass, although its then recent decision in Perez would apparently have allowed a broader construction, is admirable. While construing the statute as the government urged would not directly have threatened constitutional rights, these rights15 0 were indirectly jeopardized: A contrary decision in Bass would have encouraged prosecutors to seek to avoid proving a commerce nexus in other federal criminal statutes, even those with congressional findings of impact on interstate commerce less explicit than those in Perez and Bass. 15 As a result, defendants whose alleged acts should not have been the subject of a federal prosecution would have been haled into federal court. This development would have been pernicious, even if the same acts would have justified a state prosecution, 5 2 because of the potential for harassment created by the prospect of multiple trials and multiple punishments. 1 53 After adhering to the principles of strict construction so carefully, the Court surprisingly veered from them in the last paragraph of its opinion. In a criminal case, the commerce clause guarantees the defendant's right to a decentralized decisionmaking process, with its promises of "greater accuracy" and of "greater protection of liberty." Id. § 5-21, at 307 (emphasis deleted). On the relationship between protected rights and strict construction, see supra text accompanying notes 49-53. Although the extent of the required nexus to commerce had not previously been an issue in Bass, 154 Justice Marshall suggested some ways in which the government might prove possession in or affecting commerce., 55 Providing such dicta to guide lower courts is not unreasonable per se. The Court went on, however, to specify a means of showing receipt in or affecting commerce, a provision of section 1202 that Bass had never been charged with violating. According to Bass, the commerce nexus requires only "that the firearm received has previously traveled in interstate commerce.' 5 6 In short, a defendant might be convicted although the gun's only travel in interstate commerce occurred long before his receipt of it. The Court added, with apparent pride, "This is not the narrowest possible reading of the statute "157
Cf infra
Unwilling to seem "soft" on firearms, the Court alerted prosecutors to the usefulness of section 1202's receipt provision in a case like Bass. One who possesses must have received, leaving the prosecution only the burden of tracing the firearm's movement across state lines. To decide such a matter without the aid of specific facts and focused advocacy reflects poor judicial craftsmanship. To decide the issue by construing the commerce nexus in the broadest possible way is doubly distressing, for it maximizes the possibility of prosecutorial abuse. i58 centuries-long history of regulation would justify exception from the warrant requirement set out in See. 172 Biswell thus joined Freed and Bass in a mixed bag of early constructions of the Gun Control Act of 1968. In 1971 and 1972, the Court sometimes concerned itself with problems of arbitrary enforcement and sometimes did not. Enforcement practices were directly at issue in Freed and Biswell; in the former case, the Court took a somewhat ambiguous stand in favor of restricting law enforcement access to registration information, while in Biswell the majority granted agents broad power to conduct warrantless searches. With respect to construction of the elements of criminal offenses, which has an indirect but crucial impact on law enforcement, Freed adopted an extremely liberal stance toward mens rea requirements, while Bass embraced strict construction of one provision's act requirement. Even Bass, though, equivocated in its commitment to strict construction.
C. Supreme Court Interpretation-United States v. Biswell

IV THE PERILS OF FAILING TO FOLLOW STRICT CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES
Surveying the defendants in United States v. Freed, United States v. Bass, and
United States v. Biswell, one is tempted to say that they amply merited punishment. If the government's allegations were true, Freed and Sutherland possessed highly dangerous explosive devices without authorization; 73 in the trials of Bass and Biswell, the prosecution had proved that Bass was a convicted felon in possession of firearms 74 and that Biswell was a firearms dealer holding gangster-style weapons that he had no right to possess.' 75 Each defendant thus threatened significant wrongdoing. How can it be argued that a court should have foregone punishing each of them?
Such an argument begins by focusing not on the individuals Freed and Sutherland, Bass, and Biswell, but on the impact of those decisions on subsequent cases. The Court's willingness in Biswell to stretch the fourth amendment 7 6 created an incentive for law enforcement officials to seek further elasticity in that amendment's protection. In addition, the Court's failure in Freed to enunciate clearly its adherence to fifth amendment principles 7 7 opened the way for some erosion of those principles. 620-22 (1977) , the Court implied that the diminished expectation of privacy of one who sends mail across an international border is similar to the diminished privacy expectation of one who enters the weapons trade. Cf supra note 169.
This implication is undercut byJustice Douglas's own words in
187. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981), found "a substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety conditions in the Nation's underground and surface mines." Further, "[tihe Act is specifically tailored to address th[at] concern, and the regulation of mines it imposes is sufficiently pervasive and defined that the owner of such a facility cannot help but be aware that he 'will be subject to effective inspection.' " Id. at 603 (quoting Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316). (f supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
In response to Dewey's argument that there was no long history of regulation of stone quarries, 452 U.S. at 605, the Court noted that while "the duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important factor in determining" the applicability of the warrant requirement, it could not be "'the only criterion. 198 It is certainly arguable that these courts of appeals decisions have extended Biswell further than the 1972 Court would have gone-indeed, further even than the current Supreme Court would go if it were to review each of them. Thus, one cost of judicial decisions granting law enforcement officers leeway is the clear likelihood that other courts will extend that precedent, allowing even greater leeway.
Other costs result even when a subsequent court resists the temptation to expand the precedent. By the time a later court has refused to extend a precedent like Biswell, there usually will have been a warrantless search and a prosecution based on that search. These actions will have compromised the defendant's life in a way that no judicial victory can cure. Even more costly is the breach of wholly innocent persons' privacy rights : For every illegal search that turns up an offense, there will be scores, even hundreds, of warrantless searches which reveal no criminal activity.' 9 9 For the innocent, there will be neither judicial vindication nor redress of any kind. 2 0 0 In order to avoid these costs, courts should refrain from giving law enforcement officials the incentive to test the limits of their powers to search and seize. Reaching a different result in Biswell would have been a step in the direction of reducing this incentive.
Similar problems arose, but to a lesser extent, in the wake of the Freed Court's fifth amendment holding. By implying that the fifth amendment offered no protection against self-incrimination regarding future crimes, Freed opened the door for decisions like United States v. Apfelbaum. 2 0 ' The government had compelled Apfelbaum's testimony before a grand jury under a grant of immunity that prohibited subsequent use against him of the compelled testimony. The single exception to the immunity agreement was that false statements to the grand jury could form the basis of a perjury charge. 2 0 2 When the government later charged Apfelbaum with perjury, it introduced not only the allegedly false compelled testimony, but also the testimony leading up to the false statements; the government conceded that this other testimony by Apfelbaum was truthful. Apfelbaum argued that his truthful compelled statements should be inadmissible. If they were admitted into evidence, he reasoned, the government would have succeeded in compelling him to incriminate himself with regard to a future crime of perjury. In other words, the government would have forced Apfelbaum to give answers that would help to convict him of the perjury he was about to commit. The Court rejected this contention, holding that "a future intention to commit perjury . . .is not by itself sufficient to create a 'substantial and "real"' hazard that permits invocation of the Fifth Amendment.-20 3 In support of this conclusion the Court quoted in full Freed's enigmatic rejection of the fifth amendment as "insulation for a career of crime about to be launched. " 204 If Freed had not cast doubt on the fifth amendment's prevention of compulsory self-incrimination regarding future crimes, it is questionable whether the Apfelbaum prosecutor would have been tempted to use the truthful portion of Apfelbaum's compelled testimony. Moreover, if he had not been so tempted, there would have been no Apfelbaum decision-which decision will in turn encourage prosecutors to seek further diminutions of the fifth amendment's protections. The Freed analogy was rejected in prosecutions for failure to notify one's draft board of a change in status, 21 6 failure to report currency transactions, 21 7 and reentry by a deported alien. 21 8 Even in those cases that refused to adopt strict liability, harm was done to the defendants, in the form of public accusations and public trials. In at least some of the cases analogized to Freed, further damage was done because the courts imposed liability without fault where the Freed Court probably would not have done so.
The latter point emerges more clearly from examination of cases applying [W]here, as here and as in... Freed, dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Gross' conduct constituted dealing and that section 922 did not require any proof of an intent to deal in firearms. For the latter point, the court relied on Freed. 22 4 While it may have been easy to presume that possessors of hand grenades knew they were engaged in wrongdoing (and thus easy to dispense with mens rea), it should have been far more difficult to assume that Gross, who bought and sold a few guns in allegedly mistaken reliance on a government document,225 acted with culpable intent. Nevertheless, the court affirmed his conviction.
A more widespread injustice flowing from the Freed decision concerns defendants charged under section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code with possession of gangster-style weapons such as submachine guns and fully automatic rifles. 22 6 The difficulty here is that these weapons may be externally indistinguishable from legal weapons, all modifications having been done internally. With but one exception, 22 7 the courts of appeals have held that the government must prove only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm-not that the defendant knew of the characteristics that made the firearm illegal under the statute. 228 The decisions relied on Freed.
For example, in United States v. Thomas 22 9 the defendant claimed (without contradiction) that he had found a firearm some sixteen and one-half inches long while horseback riding. Thinking it was an antique pistol, Thomas kept ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1) The weapon was in fact a .22 caliber rifle with a short barrel; section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code requires the registration of such a weapon prior to its possession and the payment of a tax prior to its transfer. 23 '
In his prosecution for violating section 5861, Thomas argued that his mistake regarding the nature of the firearm should be a defense, but the trial court specifically rejected this contention. 232 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government needed to prove only that the defendant knew he possessed and transferred a firearm. 23 The inequity of the Thomas decision was emphasized in Judge Hufstedler's dissent, which argued that inferring knowledge of wrongdoing from possession of a firearm is not the same thing as inferring such knowledge from possession of hand grenades.
2 37 The prevalence of ordinary firearms in our society means that a person in Thomas' position is given no reason to suspect that his conduct is criminal. 238 Consequently, Judge Hufstedler concluded, the government should at least be required to prove that Thomas knew he possessed and transferred a short-barreled rifle.
2 39 The Thomas dissent correctly analyzes the specific mens rea question involved, but the issue never would have arisen if Freed had been decided differently: Without the Freed Court's embrace of strict liability, it is unlikely that a federal prosecutor would have been inclined to charge Thomas in the first place. Another defect springs from the mens rea holding in Freed. In some prosecutions under section 922 of title 18 and under section 1202 of the appendix to title 18, it is necessary to prove that the defendant has been convicted of a felony. 240 Relying on Freed, the courts of appeals have held that a defendant's mistaken belief that he is not a convicted felon is no defense.
4 1
In United States v. Sutton, 24 2 for instance, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Sutton's conviction under section 1202 24 3 -even though the state that had convicted him of a felony had restored his civil rights and had issued him a permit authorizing him to possess firearms, a permit which was, under state law, available only to nonfelons. 24 4 According to the appellate court, it was proper not to instruct the jury on the defendant's knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, because section 1202 "does not require such knowledge.
'24 5 A person without a previous felony conviction may legally purchase the guns that Sutton bought. To the extent Sutton believed he was such a person, 2 4 6 he acted without mental fault. Nothing about his situation can be said to have put him on notice of his proximity to wrongdoing. The Freed analogy should therefore have failed on the Sutton facts.
A final example of the extreme prosecutions for which the strict liability holding in Freed is at least partially responsible is United States v. Parker.
47
Parker shared a house with two others. When a visitor to the house became rowdy and cut Parker, he armed himself with a shotgun belonging to one of his roommates and fled the house. The defendant carried the gun, which was an unregistered sawed-off shotgun (and therefore illegal for anyone to possess, under section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code 248 ), for approximately thirty minutes, apparently in order to defend himself if confronted by his previous attacker. 24 9 At trial Parker argued that the government's burden of proving a knowing possession included proof of "possession not justified by some innocent reason." 2 5°1 Amazingly, the government's reply argued that under section 5861, "criminal liability . . . is absolute for those receiving or possessing illegal firearms regardless of how innocent or exigent the circumstances." ' 25 ' The Fifth Circuit all but adopted the government's position; the court stopped short only because the factsParker held the gun for a few minutes after his assailant departed the scenedid not require resolution of the issue. 25 2 Among other cases, the court cited Freed.
Certainly Freed emboldened the Parker prosecutor to argue as he did, and Freed did nothing to discourage the appellate court from ruling as it did. If Freed had instead forcefully asserted the need to prove a culpable mental state in every prosecution for a serious crime, both the argument and the ruling in Parker might well have been different.
The mens rea holding in Freed spawned a number of dubious decisions and an even larger number of dubious prosecutions. 2 53 These injustices are part of the price to be paid for failing to construe strictly criminal statutes. Most prolific in its reliance on Bass has been the Ninth Circuit. There, fidelity to the rule of lenity has produced decisions holding that purchasing drugs for personal use is not facilitation of a drug-trafficking conspiracy, 2 62 that Forest Service employees are not protected within the terms of the statute prohibiting assaults on federal officers, 26 3 that remote sellers of gambling devices do not facilitate the gambling done with those devices, 2 64 that entry into the United States is complete only when one is free from official restraint, 2 6 5 that forged postal money orders fall within an exclusion from the National Stolen Property Act, 26 6 and that violations of administrative regulations punishable only by civil sanctions do not render a gambling operation illegal.
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The variety of these cases suggests the far-reaching effect that one instance of strict construction can have on lower courts. But this is just the tip of the iceberg: Apart from the judiciary are the prosecutors, whose attitudes toward marginal prosecutions are reoriented by an example of strict construction.
And when these shifts in attitude are communicated to agents and investigators, their perspectives change as well.
Regarding the Gun Control Act of 1968, the Bass decision's adherence to strict construction had an impact on parts of the Act other than the specific provision at issue in that case. In the courts of appeals, the emphasis in Bass on the lenity principle has most affected the determination of the number of charges for simultaneous acts. In United States v. Kinsley, 28 6 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the multiple convictions of former felons who had been found in possession of four firearms "at a single time and place." 2 8 7 Their trial resulted in four convictions under section 1202 of the appendix to title 18 and four sentences (three consecutive and one concurrent) for each defendant. 288 After extended consideration of the rule of lenity and the language, history, and structure of section 1202, the appellate court found that simultaneous possession of multiple weapons was but one offense. 2 These cases are the most discernable fruits of the Bass decision's strict construction, 29 3 but certainly are not the only ones. For each of these reported instances of restraint, there surely were many that went unnoticed, but which nevertheless reduced the incidence of overzealous law enforcement.
Ironically, the rule of lenity has had the least impact on the precise concern of the Bass opinion, the commerce nexus in possession cases under section 1202 of the appendix to title 18.294 On this point, the ill-considered dictum in Bass regarding receipt prosecutions has had a greater effect than the rule of lenity.
The Bass Court rendered two unnecessary opinions. 29 5 The less egregious of the two was advice on how to prove possession in commerce (which was the precise issue in Still motivated by the same spirit, the Sixth Circuit in 1976 disavowed the restrictive Bass dictum regarding possession in commerce, choosing instead to apply the view of the commerce nexus in receipt prosecutions set out in Bassthat previous interstate movement, by anyone at any time, was sufficient-to all prosecutions under section 1202, whether for possession or for receipt. In United States v. Jones, 300 the court announced: "[T]he course of conduct which Congress intended to punish is the same regardless of whether the facts... show a receipt or a possession. There is no logic in the position that a nexus sufficient to support a conviction for receipt . . .will not also support a conviction for possession .... 301 The Sixth Circuit thus flatly refused to follow the Supreme Court's explicit strict construction in Bass. 302 Some other circuits were not as bold and applied the Court's strict construction, 30 3 but their timidity later proved to be misguided. When the matter of the commerce nexus in possession cases again reached the Supreme Court in Scarborough v. United States, 3 0 4 the Court found it easy to abandon one Bass dictum in favor of the other, more permissive dictum. In the course of holding that a convicted felon violates section 1202 by possessing a firearm that has previously been in interstate commerce, the Court brushed off its previous, more limited interpretation of possession in commerce: "While such a requirement would make sense, further consideration has persuaded us that that was not the choice Congress made." 30 5 In this fashion, the wholly unnecessary dictum in Bass regarding receipt in commerce became the lowest common denominator of section 1202, forcing the commerce nexus for other aspects of the section down to its level. 30 As with Freed's enthusiastic adoption of strict liability, the Bass Court's departure from the rule of lenity had repercussions both unforeseen and unfortunate. Analysis of the implementation of the Gun Control Act of 1968 has reformed this attitude. Unless carefully monitored by the courts, new gun control legislation will lead to overzealous law enforcement, which will take a very high toll on the ordinary citizen. 30 8 This article has attempted to demonstrate that with regard to the most significant existing gun control statute, our highest court has not discharged its duty of careful monitoring. There is little reason to believe that other courts have performed better. Thus, enthusiasm for gun control must be suspended, at least until this judicial record improves.
There is a wider message in this shift in my opinion. Without a judiciary committed to strict construction, the public could eventually grow suspicious of any proposed change in the law of crimes. Without a mechanism for discouraging police and prosecutors from extending the scope of new language in the criminal statutes, the populace (through the legislature) might choose instead to cling to present laws, whatever their deficiencies. Widespread adoption of this attitude would paralyze needed criminal law reform.
Perhaps this thinking is precisely what underlies the public's suspicion of gun control. Liberal readings of current statutes have led to abusive investigations and dubious prosecutions. The reaction of many gun owners has been to distrust the motives of those who propose even the mildest forms of gun control, 3 0 9 producing a political stalemate.
Strict construction of existing weapons statutes will ultimately diminish this distrust. To facilitate a measured process of reform in this and in other areas of criminal law, as well as to restrict arbitrary and discriminatory law 305. Id. at 575 n.I I (citations omitted). 
